Organisational theory, revolutionary program, revolutionary practice

Leninist Organisation - Part 6
Ernest Mandel

After the traumatic shock suffered by Lenin on August 4, 1914, however, he too made a decisive step forward on this question. From then on, the question of organisation became one not only of function but also of content. 

It is no longer simply a question of contrasting "the organisation" in general to "spontaneity" in general, as Lenin frequently does in What is to Be Done? and in One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward. Now it is a question of carefully distinguishing between an objectively conservative organisation and an objectively revolutionary one. This distinction is made according to objective criteria (revolutionary program, bringing this program to the masses, revolutionary practice, etc.), and the spontaneous combativity of the masses is consciously preferred to the actions or even the existence of conservative reformist mass organisations. "Naïve" organisational fetishists might claim that after 1914 Lenin went over to the Luxemburgist view of "spontaneism" when, in conflicts between "unorganised masses" and the social-democratic organisation, he systematically defends the former against the latter, or accuses the latter of betraying the former. [1] Lenin now even regards the destruction of conservatised organisations as an inescapable prerequisite for the emancipation of the proletariat. [2]

Yet the correction, or better yet completion, of his theory of organisation, which Lenin undertook after 1914 was not a step backward to the worship of "pure" spontaneity, but rather a step forward toward distinguishing between the revolutionary party and organisation in general. Now, instead of saying that the purpose of the party is to develop the political class consciousness of the working class, the formula becomes much more precise: The function of the revolutionary vanguard consists in developing revolutionary consciousness in the vanguard of the working class. The building of the revolutionary class party is the process whereby the program of the socialist revolution is fused with the experience the majority of the advanced workers have acquired in struggle. [3]

This elaboration and expansion of the Leninist theory of organisation following the outbreak of the first world war goes hand in hand with an expansion of the Leninist concept of the relevance of revolution to the present. Although before the year 1914 this was for Lenin limited by and large to Russia, after 1914 it was extended to all of Europe. (After the Russian revolution of 1905 Lenin had already recognised the immediate potential for revolutions in the colonies and semi-colonies.) Consequently, the validity of the Leninist "strategic plan" for the imperialist countries of Western Europe today is closely tied to the question of the nature of the historical epoch in which we live. From the standpoint of historical materialism, one is justified in deriving a conception of the party from the "present potential for revolution" only if one proceeds from the assumption - correct and probable, in our estimation - that beginning with the first world war, and no later than the Russian October revolution, the world-wide capitalist system entered an epoch of historic structural crisis [4] which must periodically lead to revolutionary situations. If, on the other hand, one assumes that we are still in an ascending stage of capitalism as a world system, then such a conception would have to be rejected as being completely "voluntaristic." For what is decisive in the Leninist strategic plan is certainly not revolutionary propaganda - which, of course, revolutionaries have to carry out even in nonrevolutionary periods - but its focus on revolutionary actions breaking out in the near or not distant future. Even in the ascending epoch of capitalism such actions were possible (cf. the Paris Commune), but only as unsuccessful exceptions. Under such conditions, building a party by concentrating efforts on preparing to effectively participate in such actions would hardly make sense.

The difference between a "workers party" in general (referring to its membership or even its electoral supporters) and a revolutionary workers party (or the nucleus of such a party) is to be found not only in program or objective social functions (which is to promote, not pacify, all objectively revolutionary mass actions, or all challenges and forms of action that attack and call into question the essence of the capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois state), but also in its ability to find a suitable pedagogical method enabling it to bring this program to ever-growing numbers of workers.

One can go further, however, and formulate the question more sharply: Is the danger of the apparatus becoming autonomous limited only to opportunist and reformist "workers" organisations, or does it threaten any organisation, including one with a revolutionary program and a revolutionary practice? Is not a developing bureaucracy the unavoidable consequence of any division of labour, including that between "leadership" and "membership," and even in a revolutionary group? And is not, therefore, every revolutionary organisation, once it has spread beyond a small milieu, condemned at a certain point in its development and in the development of mass struggles to become a brake on the struggle of the proletarian masses for emancipation?

If this line of argument were accepted as correct, it could lead to only one conclusion: that the socialist emancipation of the working class and of humanity is impossible - because the supposedly inevitable "autonomisation" and degeneration of any organisation must be seen as one part of a dilemma, the other part of which is represented by the tendency for all unorganised workers, all intellectuals only partially involved in action, and all persons caught up in universal commodity production to sink into a petty-bourgeois "false consciousness." Only a comprehensive, revolutionary practice, aiming at total consciousness and enriching theory, makes it possible to avoid the penetration of the "ideology of the ruling class" into even the ranks of individual revolutionaries. This can only be a collective and organised practice. If the above argument were correct, one would have to conclude that, with or without an organisation, advanced workers would be condemned either not to reach political class consciousness or to rapidly lose it.

In reality, this line of argument is false since it equates the beginning of a process with its end result. Thus, from the existence of a danger that even revolutionary organisations will become autonomous, it deduces, in a static and fatalistic fashion, that this autonomy is inevitable. This is neither empirically nor theoretically demonstrable. For the extent of the danger of bureaucratic degeneration of a revolutionary vanguard organisation - and even more of a revolutionary party - depends not only on the tendency toward autonomy, which in fact afflicts all institutions in bourgeois society, but also upon existing counter-tendencies. Among these are the integration of the revolutionary organisation into an international movement which is independent of "national" organisations and which constantly keeps a theoretical eye on them (not through an apparatus but through political criticism); a close involvement in the actual class struggle and actual revolutionary struggles that make possible a continuous selection of cadres in practice; a systematic attempt to do away with the division of labour by ensuring a continuous rotation of personnel between factory, university and full-time party functionaries; institutional guarantees (limitations on the income of full-timers, defence of the organisational norms of internal democracy and the freedom to form tendencies and factions, etc.).

The outcome of these contradictory tendencies depends on the struggle between them, which, in turn, is ultimately determined by two social factors: [5] on the one hand, the degree of special social interest set loose by the "autonomous organisation," and on the other hand, the extent of the political activity of the vanguard of the working class. Only when the latter decisively diminishes can the former decisively break out into the open. Thus, the entire argument amounts to a tedious tautology: During a period of increasing passivity the working class cannot be actively struggling for its liberation. It does not at all prove that during a period of increasing activity on the part of advanced workers, revolutionary organisations are not an effective instrument for bringing about liberation, though their "arbitrariness" can and must be circumscribed by the independent activity of the class (or of its advanced sections). The revolutionary organisation is an instrument for making revolutions. And, without the increasing political activity of broad masses of workers, proletarian revolutions are simply not possible.

ENDS

Ernest Mandel was a key Marxist economist and politcal theorist and longstanding leader of the Fourth International. He died in 1995.

NOTES

[1] Lenin, "Der Zusammenbruch der II Internationale" in Lenin and Zinoviev, Gegen den Strom (published by the Communist International, 1921), p.164.

[2] Ibid., p.165.

[3] Lenin, "Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" in Collects Works, Vol.31 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1966). Pp.17-118.

See also the above-mentioned passage from the pamphlet What Does the Spartacus League Want?, written by Rosa Luxemburg.

This conclusion was, superior to that of Trotsky in 1906 or Luxemburg in 1904. In the face of a growing conservatism on the part of the social-democratic apparatus, they had illusions about the ability of the masses to solve the problem of the seizure of power with the aid of their revolutionary ardour alone. In "The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions," (in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, op. cit., pp.153-219) Luxemburg even shifts the problem temporarily onto the "unorganised," i.e., the poorest, section of the proletariat that for the first time attains consciousness during a mass strike. In his writings after 1914 Lenin too explicitly contrasts these masses to the "labour aristocracy," in a somewhat oversimplified manner, in my opinion. At that time the workers in the large steel and metal processing plants, among others, belonged to the unorganised sectors of the German proletariat, and while they turned to the left en masse after 1918, they did not at all belong to the "poorest" layers.

[4] This so-called general crisis of capitalism, i.e., the onset of the historical epoch of the decline of capitalism, should not be confused with conjunctural crises, i.e., periodic economic crises. These have occurred during the period of rising, as well as declining, capitalism, For Lenin, the epoch beginning with the first world war is the "era of beginning social revolution." See, among others, Gegen den Strom, op. cit., p.393.

[5] Herein undoubtedly lies the greatest weakness of this fatalistic theory Out of the tendency toward growing autonomy, it automatically deduces a social danger, without including in its analysis the transmission of potential social power and specific social interests. The tendency for doormen and cashiers to develop their own interests does not give them power over banks and large firms - except for the "power" of robbery, which is effective only under very specific conditions. If the analysis of this tendency toward autonomy is to have any social content, therefore, it must be accompanied by a definition of these conditions.

RE: SADTU LEADERSHIP HAS SOLD OUT

                                                           Dear comrade Branch Chairperson

RE: SADTU LEADERSHIP HAS SOLD OUT

We refer to your letter dated 06 September 2010 entitled “SADTU leadership has sold out”, wherein you concluded that the national office bearers, in particular SADTU President Thobile Ntola, must “come to explain to the membership the current confusion made around the suspension of the strike, and that Zwelinzima Vavi explains his unwarranted media utterances on the strike offer”.

We are taking this extraordinary step to respond to the branch chairperson against all protocols because we feel we owe you, and all other members of the COSATU unions who may share your sentiment about a ‘selling out leadership’, an explanation when that is demanded.

As you are aware, SADTU, together with all other public sector unions’ majority of who, in terms of membership, are affiliated to COSATU, started negotiations with the state in October 2009. You will also be aware that government’s opening offer was a 5.2% wage increase, with no improvement on the housing allowance. The unions’ opening demands was for an 11% increase and a R2500 housing allowance, amongst others.

In May 2010, after six months of negotiations, the unions declared a dispute. Government, over six months, improved its offer to from 5,2% to 6.2% and the housing allowance from R500 to R620.  The unions had in the course of negotiations also dropped its demands to 8.6% and R1000 for housing allowance.

COSATU leadership were not involved in these negotiations. The leaders of all the public sector unions also do not sit in the Public Sector Central Bargaining Chamber (PSCBC). They are represented in the talks by their union officials.

At this stage of the negotiations, the leadership called on the President of the Federation, comrade Sidumo Dlamini, to intervene to try and unlock an impasse. The President of the Federation proceeded to arrange a meeting with the Minister, Richard Baloyi, which took place on 4 August 2010. The President invited the COSATU General Secretary, who insisted that the Minister of Finance be part of the meeting, since it is he who holds the government purse.

Before the two COSATU leaders engaged with the two government Ministers (of Public Administration and of Finance) the COSATU General Secretary asked a question to the President who had interacted with the COSATU public sector unions and asked: what is the settlement demand of the unions?

The response was that the unions are willing to settle at 7% and R750 for housing. For many hours we pushed the two government leaders towards this “settlement demand”. Eventually the government relented and agreed in principle, subject to further calculation on their part to ascertain that this would be within their affordability range.

From the meeting we went to report to the leaders of the COSATU unions who confirmed that indeed in their previous discussions they did raise 7% and R750 as one of the scenarios for a possible settlement.

We participated in the protest marches held on 10 August 2010. The plan in terms of our discussion was that the government would convene the PSCBC on the evening of the 10 August 2010 to table the 7% and R700 formally. This did not happen because the government was still calculating the affordability of the compromise emerging from the meeting with the COSATU leadership, as explained above. You will recall that the COSATU unions had given government up to Thursday 12 August 2010 to improve the offer or face a protracted strike.

Indeed the government presented the revised offer to the PSCBC on 11^th October 2010. It was at this time that the COSATU General Secretary, informed by the processes outlined above, participated in the SABC Morning Live programme and recommended that the unions consider the offer favourably.  Again it is important to state that he had done so not because he was eager to sell out or to act as a government spin-doctor as the letter alleges. The processes outlined above informed this call.

Nevertheless as we said to the unions at the time, we had a responsibility to recommend the offer, as it was we who had induced the government to make a move on the basis that this was to settle the dispute and avoid a protracted strike action. It would be absolutely be hypocritical for us to turn around and be the ones who reject the offer first considering the effort we put to secure the 7% and R700.

Indeed all union leaders would have spoken in the media and their structures recommending the government revised offer. We did make it clear however to government and to one another as leaders that whilst we must protect our integrity with the government we must be loyal to members if they decide to reject the 7% and R700 housing allowance.

Indeed all unions later reported that the 7% and R700 were roundly rejected by members. This meant all attempts to avoid a protracted strike had failed. The strike started on 12 August 2010.

The COSATU CEC met on 23-25 August 2010, which was the 12^th day of the strike. The CEC decided not to allow a defeat of the strike. All unions of COSATU issued secondary notices, which in terms of the LRA, should be 7 days. This was a historic decision! Never in the 25 years history of COSATU did the unions pull a sympathy strike on the scale envisaged. What many don’t know is that this was not an easy decision. Some unions asked questions – “what is so special with the public sector workers?” They were referring to many occasions when other workers in the private sectors earning far less pay than the public servants had embarked on strikes lasting up to 6 months without any form of support from the rest of the COSATU-affiliated unions. The argument however won a day that COSATU can’t afford to have over a third of its members defeated by a single employer as that would create a precedent and set the tone for all other negotiations in the private sector.

Bearing in mind all the above, the COSATU leaders were crossing fingers that this resolve for a sympathy strike would not be tested, in case our threats became a damp squib due to lack of enthusiastic support across all COSATU unions.

Going back to the CEC, we must state that the Secretary General of the ANC, comrade Gwede Mantashe came to the CEC and held a meeting with some of the leaders of the public sector (NEHAWU and SADTU), together with the President of the COSATU.

The Secretary General wanted to know what offer could settle the strike. He was told that a 7,5% increase and an R800 housing allowance would settle the strike. We want to emphasize again that the comrades who answered the question were not motivated by eagerness to sell out. This was the 12^th day of the strike. They were acutely aware of how difficult it was for government to move from 6,5% to 7% and from R630 to R700 for the housing allowance in the earlier political intervention led by the COSATU President and the General Secretary. They put figures across that they thought would be a good area for a settlement.

The Secretary General went away to work for this. In the meantime COSATU unions’ negotiators drafted a draft agreement of what came to be known as the COSATU draft agreement for settlement of the strike. The COSATU President and General Secretary complimented the Secretary General’s intervention. In a combined but parallel process they knocked at every door of the highest offices.

Eventually government agreed to revise its offer and was ready to present it on 1 September 2010. This means government was prepared to sign on the COSATU union’s drafted settlement, which was for 7, 5% and R800.

Even before the government could present this, the COSATU General Secretary, after realising that chances were high that this would be rejected by members, opened a parallel discussion with the Minister of Finance urging him to move further to 8% and R850, 00 for housing. The push for this continued in the marathon discussion between the COSATU President and General Secretary with no less than 6 government ministers on the evening of 2 September 2010.

It was in the early hours of 3 September that the Ministers received a call from someone more senior than them. At that moment negotiations stopped, never to be continued again. Government ministers, in the face of the call they received, simply folded their files and declared there was nothing more they could do. The government was accusing unions of tricking them into believing that the strike would end after they improved the offer from 6,5% to 7% and R630 to R700 and later to 7,5% and R800. Now the unions were saying that is also not good enough and were asking for 8% and R850. Our integrity was in their eyes was in tartars. They were ordered to stop engaging with us, as it was a waste of time. We were seen as not being honest and or even informed by other political objectives.

Faced with this situation the all unions, including those not affiliated to COSATU, decided to allow government to formally present the improved offer of 7,5% and R800. Aware of all of this COSATU General Secretary again participated in the SABC’s Morning Live and made the statement that the unions have pushed as far as they could AND that there is no possibility of government improving its offer unless members push them in a strike of the same scale for another 2 to 3 weeks. It is this statement that makes Mthatha SADTU branch to accuse the General Secretary of speaking like a government spokesperson.

At this moment and a few days later, unions were facing two big problems. On one side there were no more negotiations taking place. This meant from the morning when Ministers were ordered to stop engaging, every hour and every day workers’ sacrifice were in vain. On the other hand the days were accumulating, meaning with members losing days of wages through the application of the no-work no-pay principle. Around that time the unions started to calculate that workers were now losing so much that even if government were to concede and provide the 1% now separating the parties, the losses incurred by workers in meant they would still be the bigger losers financially.

The strike itself was no longer as effective as it was in the first two weeks. Most of the government departmental workers had gone to back to work and were only coming out to participate in the marches. The numbers of workers in the picket lines were dwindling. Some nurses started to moonlight in the private hospitals and only joined the picket lines during the day. Only SADTU and NEHAWU were effectively out on strike across all nine provinces. The pressure was mounting, with media growing hostile after government claimed a number of deaths in public hospitals.

A danger was looming that if the unions did not make a strategic retreat and sign the agreement in terms that they could still dictate, the strike might fizzle out in the fourth and fifth week. Government would then punish the nurses and all other workers it sought to declare as essential service workers. From this point NEHAWU, DENOSA and SADNU were carrying a bigger risk for possible mass dismissals if this scenario unfolded into a reality.

It was at this point that all unions convened their National Executive Committees, which eventually decided to suspend the strike.

In short it is not the SADTU President, the NEHAWU General Secretary or the COSATU General Secretary or anyone else who sold out! 

The only mistake the leaders committed was to twice propose a settlement area without canvassing this properly with their provincial structures. Secondly the provincial leaders were not in our view properly briefed all the time about the political interventions taking place. The public criticism of the ANC Secretary General has an element of truth even though it was unfortunate because it was made in public and was seen to be reinforcing a rightwing element in society. In future consideration must be given to the provincial leaders sitting directly in the negotiations.

We however insist that the leaders of the public sector unions were not necessarily wrong to try finding a solution informed by the reality they were facing as leaders sitting across a fire.

You will probably say that is what they were elected for – to face difficult moments and provide leadership. To us the fundamental question is whether the union leaders acted in the best interest of members under the circumstances or not? Or did they simply collapse because they were motivated by reasons of pursuing their narrow careers in government as alleged in the letter of Mthatha SADTU branch.  In our view they held out for their members’ right through under very difficult conditions.

We hope this letter will clarify the matter

 
Yours comradely
 
 
Zwelinzima Vavi
General Secretary
 
c.c. COSATU NOBs

INSTITUTIONAL STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (ISRC) MEDIA STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION AT WALTER SISULU UNIVERSITY NMD SITE (15/09/10

As the Institutional Student Representative Council (ISRC) of Walter Sisulu university, we would like to take this opportunity to respond to the slanderous lies projected as the view of the entire student body and clarify the issues and statements that have been presented to the public by a group of individuals who claim to be our sub structure posing them selves as the Nelson Mandela Drive Site student leadership.
The recent violent and criminal occurrences that have continued to exist at the Nelson Mandela Drive Site which have resulted to the closure and reopening of that particular site, have further resulted to a continued disruption of the core business of the university, is an unfortunate, opportunistic and disappointing tendency that is aimed at rendering the University ungovernable and project it as unstable. Walter Sisulu University is an institution named after a man of excellence, integrity and wisdom, who vowed to suffer under the system until he defeated it. It is our considered view that the guiding principles and values of our merged institution are premised on these sacrosanct and instructive values of this giant of our people. Having said the above, we wish to put on record the following:

• WSU Student leadership is not a body to be used for personal ambitions driven by subsidiary emergent predatory elite which are inside and outside the university. Amongst other duties our jurisdiction remains that of sound student interest towards the total transformation of our university. The call for the university vice chancellor to step down is a view of not even 3% of the population of our constituency .we the fore want to distance our selves from a process that undermines the legitimate voice of students in other Campuses and democratically elected governing structures .we further want to re affirm our support for the VC in fast tracking the process of re accreditation of the Bcom accounting program at WSU by the South African Institute for Charter Accountants. As we speak SAICA is at the University as part of this effort.

• The commitment of being resource conscious by utilizing the university’s resources prudently and responsibly is an important value to us in making it a point that we safeguard the little facilities and resources that we have with the view of adding maximum value to our institution. We fully support concrete and sound student issues that are procedurally raised by recognized sub structure of the ISRC .We therefore wish to strongly condemn the criminal and violent acts that have manifested at NMD in the past two weeks. Burning of vehicles, facilities and vandalism is an act contrary to act 108 of 1996, standard university statute, university policies and the SRC constitution .Therefore as the ISRC in a developing African university we wish to state it clearly that WSU has no space for criminals who masquerade as students. Those responsible for this mess must be called to book.

• It is regrettable that there has been innocent students that have been arrested ,having been used by this populist syndicate ,which in turn is now enjoying itself, proud of their feat to temporarily evade law enforcement for their criminal actions. We pledge to do all that is within our power to ensure that these students are not incarcerated but rather the criminal elements that were key to the chaos are. As the legitimate and the elected student leadership we state once more that this behavior is not a reflection of the view of students in the university but rather an orchestrated criminal action by a group seeking attention and opportunity to lay their greedy hands on institutions of power without democratic process.

• On the academic exclusion policy popularly known as the G8.we want to make it clear that having consulted all our campus structures we have welcomed the resolution that the policy exist but in terms of implementation, the are yet to be discussions at the level of SENATE for the review of the roll-out in 2011.We are therefore busy preparing our submission to Senate in this regard.

We also wish to state it clearly that if there is any issue of principle that we are committed to ensuring that it is not compromised at any point, it is the voicing out of the correct student views at WSU.

For more information contact
Andile Majeke
ISRC President
0835601591
0729540040
or
Sabelo Dlamini
ISRC Secretary General
0833792167
Yours in Responsible Student Leadership

Are We Still Discussing ‘What is the Colour of Our Flag? Red or JZ?

By Luzuko Buku
Comrade Mzala’s remark that “Great Political Events are unfolding before our eyes” is worth remembering in this era of robust engagement within the movement. Here lets us take stock of the polemical discussion by the national leadership of the Young Communist league (YCL).

Yet again the matter surrounds the ANC President, Jacob Zuma. It is our understanding that the debates are not just technical (ANC pronouncement on public spats and stuff) but go to deeper strategic and programmatic issues within the communist movement and they are a resurfacing the discussions that unfolded just four years back.

As a response to Mazibuko Jara’s(MJ) question on “What Colour is Our Flag: Is it Red or JZ?”(2005), the YCL National Chairperson clearly stated that, “Red is the Colour of Our Flag” (2006). In addressing the question of “Working class spontaneity, the intra-class struggles within the historically oppressed and the JZ saga” Masondo clearly outlined that, “the current crisis, personified in JZ, is a cumulative experience of the last ten years, which must be located within class struggle and class formation underway, and how the post- (neo)-colonial state is used to deal with the working class, revolutionary dissent, different fractions of capital, leadership that may be sympathetic (real or perceived) to the working class, and how the state cherry-picks on corruption or selectively deals with corruption, including the arms deal. In this process of class struggle and formation, there are intra-class and inter-class contradictions, which produce particular forms of alliance, spontaneity, consciousness and organization that we may (dis)like” (2006).

Four years down the line Masondo criticises Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and coins it as the Zuma Economic Empowerment (ZEE). On this he says the following: “ZEE (Zuma Economic Empowerment) is not only an assault on the Young Communist League and South African Communist Party (SACP) resolutions – which called for the nationalisation of -monopoly industries – it amounts to a burial of the Freedom Charter...Only a few can be misled to believe that there is no link between ¬Zuma’s rise to the presidency and his ¬family’s rise to riches” (2010).

Masando might have thought that he would be a Mzala of some sort and respond to his article by himself and to his surprise the YCL National Office Bearers (NOBs) (with the exclusion of him) responded to him by releasing a highly ambiguous media statement, that does not express any fundamental disagreement with the contents of Masondo’s piece but interestingly distances itself from it. He we are concerned about the basis of the distancing.

Some individuals have superficially and insubstantially said that this whole matter is as a result of a real or perceive tension within the YCL NOBs. All would agree that despite the personalisation, the discussion raised is pitched at a level beyond this and thus ponders issues of tactical and strategic importance in the socialist struggle. The clear matter here is that the polemic does not arise as a result of the resolution of the ANC NEC on public spats and as a matter of fact there is no even an insult in the piece by the David Masondo but there is personalised criticism of the economic accumulation path.

The fundamental issue here is timing. It remains to be known if the views raised are raised in an honest manner or as a left-wing opportunistic attack on the person of the President of the ANC, thus feeding in the emergent liberal tendency seeking to dislodge the president of the ANC and further degenerate the NGC of the ANC. Why is it always the case that discussions like these emerge at a time when there is a so called (un)opened succession discussion in the ANC. One would have thought that comrade David, as a person who authored the response to MJ, would be aware of these issues and thus find ways in which to better express his views without complementing the emergent attacks on the integrity of JZ from a left-wing angle.

It is a known fact that the emergent tendency is opportunistically using the Arcelor-Mittal BEE deal involving Duduzane Zuma( JZs son), as an attempt to rubbish his integrity. What then becomes the difference between Masondo’s assertion that there is a link “between Zuma’s rise to the presidency and his ¬family’s rise to riches” and the remark by the unapologetic chief spokesperson of the emergent tendency that, “We must not allow politicians and their families to be enriched...above others.” Both are fair statements but their timing questions their honesty.

No one, including the NOBs fundamentally differs with the views raised against the rampant and preponderance of neo-liberal economic policies in South Africa but the issues is approached in a costs and benefit angle. Is our personalised criticism of the economic policy of the ANC government assisting in the fight against an emergent tendency that seeks to isolate the working class within the ANC? Our view is that exposing and isolating this emergent tendency is very fundamental in the current juncture but it should equally not compromise our strategic fight against neo-liberal economic policies.

It all bogs down to the debate on ‘non-antagonistic’ contradictions and Jeremy Cronin correctly put it that, “the fact that they are “non-antagonistic” does not mean that they are not real political contradictions ultimately located in objective realities. These contradictions have to be surfaced, debated and strategically “managed”. Their administrative suppression or the denial of their existence will inevitably undermine the living unity of the people’s camp” (Cronin, 2007).

Interestingly enough comrade Masondo(2006) asserts the following about Jara, “The issues raised are not new. They have been discussed informally and formally within and outside the SACP and YCL structures, in which MJ actively participated as a listener” and now the YCL NOBs are saying something in similar lines about him. “What is more discomforting is the fact that Comrade Masondo has never canvassed these views internally within the YCLSA” (2010).

Communist cadres must be aware of the fact that in an incumbent liberation movement( which we are allied with), jostling for position is prevalent and that any left-wing critic we offer must at all times move beyond personalities, unless we want to be viewed as anti-this or pro-that individual.

We thought it be important to close with some few relevant quotes from David’s response to MJ in 2006.

“As one reads the paper, it is not clear whether MJ is implicitly arguing against JZ becoming the ANC President, or supports the principle of innocent until proven guilty, but not as it relates to JZ because he is a 'former communist', 'traditionalist' and anti-intellectual. A delineation of issues is not a mechanical way of analysis or a mere hair splitting exercise.”

“MJ, like certain sections of our society, twist fact and tell lies that comrade Jacob Zuma is the ANC Presidential candidate of the SACP, COSATU and the YCL. These organizations have publicly and consistently said that they do not have the right to nominate or elect ANC leadership. ANC leadership issues are a matter of the ANC members, and they will only nominate or elect leadership as members of the ANC...The fact that the SACP and YCL do not have the right to vote does not stop us from analyzing the implications of presidential candidates, in the same way we do during the US general elections. The SACP must do so in a non-factionalist manner especially because we are in alliance with the ANC, and what happens within the ANC has implications on the Alliance.”

“MJs lies are also based on fallacious logic. We are told that since JZ is supported by COSATU and the SACP and is attacked by capitalists, therefore JZ is a communist, by extension the ANCYL is a communist organization. This does not follow. The fact that Muslims will be attacked by G. Bush and communists come to their defence on the basis of a principle does not mean those Muslims are Communists or vice versa.”
“Of course MJ and any South African citizen have a right to comment on anything, including the issue of the ANC Deputy President (JZ), but the comments must be without personal smear.”

Luzuko Buku is a member of YCL and SASCO in Eastern Cape. He writes this in his personal capacity.



Source List
David Masondo( 2006): Red is the Colour of our Flag, In Defence of the rule of Law.
Jeremy Cronin ( 2007): Joe Slovo: Democracy and Socialism
The Times: Malema Slams ANC leaders for Failing the poor
Mazibuko Jara( 2005): What Colour is our Flag? Is it Red or JZ?
Jabulani Nxumalo( 1985): Cooking the Rice Inside the Pot
David Masondo(2010) Black economic empowerment becomes Zuma economic empowerment'